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This article concerns the roles of entrepreneurial scientists in the co-production of life 
science research and regulation. Regulatory brokerage, defined as a mode of strategic 
planning and as the negotiation of regulation based on comparative advantage and 
competition, is expressed in scientific activities that take advantage of regulatory 
difference. This article is based on social science research in Japan, Thailand, India 
and the UK. Using five cases related to Japan’s international activities in the field of 
regenerative medicine, I argue that, driven by competitive advantage, regulatory 
brokerage at lower levels of managerial organization and governance is emulated at 
higher levels. In addition, as regulatory brokerage affects the creation of regulation at 
national, bilateral and global levels, new regulation may be based on competition in 
regulatory advantage rather than on ethical and scientific values. I argue that 
regulatory brokerage as the basis for regulatory reform bypasses issues that need to be 
decided by a broader public. More space is needed for international and political 
debate about the socio-political consequences of the global diversity of regulation in 
the field of the life sciences.  
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The translation of life science into clinical applications, especially in the field of 
regenerative medicine (RM), has led to fierce scientific and industrial competition, 
and a push to accelerate the development of innovative medical intervention 
(Doudement and Uppal, 2014; Dutton, 2007). As a result, the regulation of this 
important field is influenced by diverging, and often contradictory, pressures and 
knowledges to protect patients, to safeguard scientific development, and to facilitate 
the translational process ‘from bench to bedside’ (e.g., Blasimme and Rial-Sebbag, 
2012; Faulkner and Poort, 2017; Kahn, 2015). Thompson has characterized the ethical 
procurement and pro-cure rhetoric driving innovation and investment in California’s 
human embryonic stem cell research hub (Thompson, 2013: 29).  
Although biomedical ideologies and pro-curing framings are at the heart of 
activities to attract both financial and regulatory support for research in the field of 
RM, I am here interested in pragmatic activities that seek both to strategically utilize 
differences in regulatory regimes and broker advantageous regulation in support of 
both scientific and commercial enterprises. This two-fold meaning of ‘regulatory 
brokerage’ (further defined below) is important, because the latter usually builds on 
experience with or on awareness of the former. In my exploration of regulatory 
brokerage, I am concerned with the pragmatics of strategies followed by 
entrepreneurial scientists in creating the conditions expedient to their research and 
industrialization plans.  
This article draws on data about regulation and regulatory brokerage in India, 
Thailand and the UK, in relation to Japan. Although my focus on Japan is particularly 
helpful in illustrating regulatory brokerage, this does not imply that regulatory 
brokerage is particular prevalent in that country, or that the creation of regulation does 
not entail concerns for ethical issues. Japan has been an important player in 
developing regulation for RM and its science community is highly respected globally. 
Though relatively early in its encouragement of human embryonic stem cell research, 
its regulation of research materials and clinical trials was conservative until the 
‘Japanese’ discovery of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS), when regulation became 
considered as permissive, leading the USA and EU to reconsider their regulation. A 
comparison of regulatory brokerage at different points on this, albeit winding, 




The encouragement of life scientists to collaborate with industry in marketing their 
products has led to an increase in entrepreneurship among scientists (Jones et al., 
2011). Entrepreneurship in the world of business refers to the capacity and 
willingness to develop, organize and manage a business venture along with any of its 
risks in order to make a profit. Although entrepreneurial activities by scientists can be 
traced back to at least the 19th century, today’s complex university–firm networks 
took shape in the mid-1980s (Etzkowitz, 1983; Mirowski and Sent, 2002), when the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 and the Federal Technology Transfer Act in 1986 were 
introduced in the USA. These acts devolved the right to patent the fruits of federal-
funded research from the federal government to recipient institutions (Murray, 2004). 
European countries have followed suit, and, as a result, the share of public research 
organizations (universities and public research laboratories) in patent application has 
increased (Nesta and Mangematin, 2002, cited in Oliver, 2004: 585). A Japanese 
version of the Bayh-Dole Act (‘Law of Special Measures for Industrial 
Revitalization’) was enacted in 1999. The law facilitated the trade of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) derived from publicly funded research (Edgington, 2008: 11), 
and became a novel way of tackling healthcare costs and stimulating economic 
growth. 
 Science-company collaborations, according to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000), follow the ‘triple helix model’ of university-industry-government relations. 
The authors describe how most countries and regions try ‘to realize an innovative 
environment consisting of university spin-off firms, tri-lateral initiatives for 
knowledge-based economic development, and strategic alliances among firms’ 
(Etzkowitz and Leyesdorff, 2000: 112). Another strategy of transnational 
entrepreneurship embedded in the organizational culture of firms seeks to generate 
value through the exploitation of opportunities in the international marketplace 
(Dimitratos and Plakoiyannaki, 2003: 189). Its significance lies in that transnational 
entrepreneurship combines the pathways enabled through the triple-helix model with 
the advantages provided by collaboration with potential partners in other countries or 
regions. However, unlike the authors of bioconstutionalism, these authors do not 
include in their models the regulatory embedding of life science in society through 
‘public engagement’ or publics as actors. And although some of the workings of the 
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transnational pick-and-mix strategies have been illustrated for the global 
pharmaceutical industry (Angell, 1997; Petryna, 2009; Sunder Rajan, 2006), they 
differ in the field of RM.  
  
Clinical research and entrepreneurship in molecular and regenerative medicine 
Social scientists have observed that, in addition to human capital, social capital is 
crucial to scientists’ collaborations with industry (Murray, 2004; Stuart and Ding, 
2006). It has also been observed that scientists working with the pharmaceutical 
industry take advantage of ethical variability regarding global clinical trials and 
clinical studies in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Petryna 2006, 2009). 
In the case of RM, differences in geographical conditions and regulatory factors are 
important to decisions companies make about where to locate. This is related to 
fundamental differences between the testing of stem cells and molecular medicine.  
 Compared to molecular medicinal drugs, cell products are unstable, as the 
state of the cell in RM is critical from the stage of harvesting to the point of 
implantation (Mason and Hoare, 2007). Cells, unlike drugs, have the ability to 
multiply. Although it is the regenerative potential that makes stem cell treatments 
promising, it also poses risks, as cell batches can vary over the course of a trial (MRC, 
2012: 16). Furthermore, the transplantation of undifferentiated stem cells can pose 
considerable risk when the cells do not ‘home in’ or develop into the kind of tissue 
expected, while with allogeneic cell applications, using cells from other people, there 
is a risk of immunological response (Interview, Michaels). Therefore, testing on 
healthy volunteers (non-patient groups) is usually not an option. Nevertheless, when 
tested in only a few patients, scientists value the outcome of a stem cell intervention 
as a strong proof of principle, unlike in molecular medicine, where statistical evidence 
in large patient numbers is usually required (Interview, Kaketani).  
 The novel nature of cell therapy development has consequences for the 
organization and funding of clinical applications. In contrast to the clinical testing of 
compounds and molecules, no internationally binding standards or harmonized 
regulatory framework, such as those of the International Council for Harmonization 
of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH, 2016), are in 
place for clinical stem cell interventions. This means that regulatory conditions vary 
starkly across countries (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al., 2016). Regulatory frameworks for 
the clinical application of stem cells have been strict and drawn-out in Europe, the 
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USA and also Japan – until recently (Blassime and Rial-Sebbag, 2013; Kawakami et 
al., 2010; Rawlins, 2010) – which is partly due to the challenges involved in the 
evaluation of new cell products (von Tigerstrom, 2015). The lengthy time of 
application and uncertainties around regulation (Roehr, 2014; Whittlesey and Witten, 
2012) have added to the high costs involved in the organization of clinical trials, 
which in the case of RM draw relatively few investors (Doudement and Uppal, 2014; 
Rosemann, 2014).  
Much state funding has been invested into stem cell research and its 
translation into clinical applications. Although some larger companies (e.g., Osiris, 
Genentec) have organized clinical stem cell trials in the US, and to a lesser extent in 
other countries, companies and researchers look to the state and NPOs for financial 
support (Dutton, 2007; Littman, 2014). The shortage of investment in RM means 
there is a great number of small biotech start-ups in academia that need to become 
self-sufficient, which has led to extensive licensing and to the globalization of this 
trade – not so much in health products, but in products or services for conducting 
research (Jones et al., 2008).  
 These differences between molecular medicine and RM have implications for 
the ways in which scientist entrepreneurs position themselves and move 
internationally. As markets for RM products and services tend to be global, they seek 
to derive competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in 
multiple countries. Such transnational entrepreneurship has been limited mainly to 
stem cell research resources, culturing services and drug screening. The testing of 
applications in RM is not as flexible and mobile as it is for pharmaceutical treatments, 
and is not targeted at LMICs. Rather than healthy volunteers, cell product testing 
requires access to patients with particular, often serious, conditions; these are not 
generally concentrated in LMICs (Earls, 2012). As such, patients have become 
increasingly mobile (Chen and Gottweis, 2011; Salter et al., 2015; Song, 2017), and 
‘stem cell tourism’ may well be an important resource for testing in some countries 
(Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2009; Song, 2010). Stem cell experimentation taking 
place in LMICs is not so much due to a lack of local healthcare access, but to 
international travel by patients who are elderly and/or have serious, intractable 
diseases.  
 The number of cell therapy products is extremely limited, considering the 
substantial investment into the field, and it is too early to say to what extent ‘stem cell 
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cures’ will be realized and when: Other than therapies for blood diseases, there are 
very few RM products that have gained market authorization (Detela, 2016).1 
However, the realization of successful cell therapies is thought to lead to a radical 
reorganization of the field of RM, including the setting of international standards, and 
a replacement of state and small investment by large-scale industrial funding. Hoping 
to influence or set the standards themselves, ambitious scientists may aim for early 




Using examples of regulatory business strategies negotiated by Japan with India, 
Thailand and the UK, I illustrate various aspects of what I call regulatory brokerage. 
In business, a broker is a go-between who ‘supports partners in navigating their 
collaboration journey by helping them to create a map, plan their route, choose their 
mode of transport, and change direction when necessary’ (Partnership Brokers 
Association, 2019). In social scientific terms, brokers are individuals who have the 
social capital, including education, career and organizational experience, to form 
connections either for themselves or their organization into other domains, social 
networks and functional areas (Murray, 2004). In the scientific community, scientists 
may establish social capital in networks of collaboration on one hand (Parker et al., 
2010; Shrum et al., 2007; Vermeulen, 2009), but remain bound within the distinctive 
practices and beliefs that constitute the knowledge community or epistemic culture 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999) on the other. In RM, understanding the distinctive institutional 
and material settings linking collaborative networks and epistemic cultures, including 
regulatory conditions, can be advantageous. Various forms of legal, procedural, moral, 
economic and industrial knowledge (Faulkner and Poort, 2017) are mobilized in 
creating research/business strategies and risks are assumed to further the interest of a 
business or lucrative research through activities ranging from administrative 
management and recruitment to raising venture capital. In brief, scientist 
entrepreneurs in the field of RM broker regulation for the sake of competitive 
advantage – be it direct profit, knowledge assets or reputation, rather than being 
decided upon on the basis of safety, efficacy and ethical concerns. The concept of 
regulatory brokerage therefore does not hinge on the particular professional 
background of the brokers, although in this research all had scientific backgrounds. 
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What is relevant here is that those engaging in regulatory brokers are aware that the 
geographical constituency to which they belong is subject to a particular regulatory 
regime. This regulatory subjecthood is treated as a form of ‘regulatory capital’ and 
commodified in the negotiation of international collaboration among science-
entrepreneurs.  
I use ‘regulatory brokerage’ to refer to, first, the use of regulation in brokering 
science collaborations at home and abroad, involving the entrepreneurial exploitation 
of the differences between regulatory regimes. Here, regulatory brokerage does not 
just take into account, but strategically bases research, the selection of research 
partnerships and localization tactics on the administrative-geographical regulation of 
science activities, including ethical-, research- and product-review. I also use the 
concept to refer to the role that brokers, often high-profile scientists and managers, 
play through their negotiation between business and regulators, officials and others 
involved in the creation of regulatory guidelines.  
Definitions of the regulator as an autocratic bureaucrat who controls the 
making and enforcement of rules are misleading. Abbott et al. (2017) show that the 
capacity of regulators is partly dependent on intermediaries. Intermediaries, who can 
range from officials and scientists to company presidents and members of NGOs 
(Abbott et al., 2017: 7) support, monitor and advise on the implementation of 
regulation. The notion of regulatory brokerage, however, pertains not so much to the 
implementation of regulation but to its active creation or reform, and it introduces a 
clear strategic direction to the (self-interested) envisaged alteration in negotiations.  
At stake are decisions about the treatment of human life, its value, citizenship, 
governance and healthcare. A main question here is whether these issues are decided 
by the state on the basis of bioconstitutional considerations (see Jasanoff, 2011), 
including public consultations, or through international competition in the life science 
research and industry in the form of regulatory brokerage. In this article, I explore 
how regulation has become an important instrument in the hands of scientist 
entrepreneurs in the course of the clinical translation of potentially marketable clinical 
applications. I intend to illustrate how taking advantage of ‘regulatory variability’ 
(Petryna, 2006, 2009) is no longer confined to the pharmaceutical industry, but has 
become a major factor in the scientific decision-making on collaboration and the 
geographical location of clinical applications, to the point of determining the rules of 
the very playing field of RM. 
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Some scientists engaged in regulatory brokerage are laboratory leaders 
without business management training; having to juggle roles, some of them engage a 
manager to help them run their company. Other regulatory brokers are scientists 
specifically hired to focus on international collaborations. They tend to focus on 
gathering information on other companies, negotiating between the companies and 
researchers they represent and their partnership targets. Still others are scientists 
exclusively running venture companies, raising venture capital, negotiating with 
industry, and communicating with regulators on the company’s behalf. I have selected 
cases of regulatory brokerage on the basis of organizational level and present them as 
cumulative; that is, the forms described first have occurred before later ones. I 
hypothesize that this is not coincidental. Although the cases are not directly related to 
one another, there are political, scientific and economic reasons for this order to be 
meaningful. I will also point out why regulatory brokerage is not inevitable, even 
where there are opportunities to benefit from regulatory discrepancies. And, finally, I 




This article is based on a project on international collaboration in the field of 
regenerative medicine, which has been on the increase in recent decades. The project 
looks into the motivation and reasons for engaging in collaboration in translational 
research. In the cases examined, regulatory conditions play a major role in the 
decision to collaborate. Once collaborations were identified, interviewees were 
located on both sides of collaboration, with the aim of understanding the advantages 
and disadvantages of regulatory brokerage on each side. Analysing the cases 
pertaining to Japan, it became clear that regulatory brokerage took place on 
increasingly high levels of organization, ranging from simple bilateral to the global 
level.  
The first four cases involve interviews and visits, while the last case involves 
the attendance of a conference. For cases one and two, I draw on interviews that took 
place in the following periods: October–December 2008; November–December 2012; 
March–July and October–December 2013; for cases three and four I draw on 
fieldwork that took place in October–December 2013 and January–March 2016. I 
approached scientists working in the field of RM, including induced pluripotent stem 
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cells, human embryonic stem cell research and tissue engineering. In Japan, 
interviews took place with research at the Centre for iPS Cell and Research 
Application (CiRA) and the Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences (iCems) in 
Kyoto, the RIKEN Centre for Development Biology (RIKEN-CDB) in Kobe, and in 
Tokyo, where I visited Keio University and the Women’s University of Science and 
Technology. In addition, I spoke with experts in the regulation, ethics and social 
aspects of science and science communication. Other interviews with researchers in 
took place in Thailand at Chulalongkorn University, in the UK at Sheffield and 
Loughborough Universities, and in India in Chennai. 
 The cases of regulatory brokerage were selected strategically on the basis of 
involvement in international collaboration and tactical use of regulatory conditions in 
the countries involved. The foregrounding of regulatory difference by the 
interviewees themselves was crucial. Methods of repeated close readings and coding 
(using notions around the key concepts of ‘commercialization’, ‘regulation’, 
‘financial support’ and ‘approval’) highlighted the roles of funders, government and 
state authorities. The scientists interviewed varied in occupation and experience from 
physicians to research scientists and from administrators to consultants; they had 
various disciplinary backgrounds, including medicine, engineering, the life sciences 
and work in the pharmaceutical industry. Although most had degrees and experience 
in at least one of the life sciences, only a few had a business background. In most 
cases, the life scientists were stimulated to look for business opportunities mid-career, 
and were struggling to learn about marketing. All interviewees, even those who had 
started a venture company themselves, were looking for partners or CEOs, who could 
‘run the business’ for them.  
 The materials presented draw on interviews with scientists, engineers, 
company managers and regulators from Japan, India, Thailand and the UK (see 
Appendix). Although many interviewees said there was no need to remain anonymous, 
I have used pseudonyms, as I aim to draw attention to regulatory brokerage rather 
than provide information on the conduct of individuals. When citations from 
secondary or archival sources are used, I use original names, unless they reveal the 





Forms of regulatory brokerage  
This section discusses five forms of regulatory brokerage (see Table 1). My 
presentation of the cases suggests that regulatory brokerage in the field of RM over 
time has increasingly involved higher levels of governance. The various forms should 
be understood together to comprehend the pressures on regulatory systems and 




Activities Level of regulatory 
brokerage 
a Informal Transnational collaboration out of regulatory 
considerations 
Sub-national  
b With state 
support 
Ibid Sub-national with 
state support  
c Deregulation Deregulation to attract international 
collaborators 
National 
d International Brokering by science-entrepreneurs, officials 
and regulators of two countries 
Bi-national 
e Global Negation among science-entrepreneurs, 
industry and regulatory agencies of leading 
regions 
International 
Table 1: Five forms of regulatory brokerage 
 
Case 1: Informal forms of regulatory brokerage 
Although Japan is known for its ‘iron triangle’ between government, bureaucrats and 
heavy industry (Johnson, 1982), until recently, Japan’s government had not succeeded 
in pushing industry to invest substantially into RM (Umemura, 2011). In 2003, Japan 
was early to make stem cells the core of its national ten-year project for RM 
development, though scientists complained that stem cell regulation was both strict 
and bureaucratic (Nakatsuji, 2007; Slingby et al., 2004). Japan’s first RM product, an 
autologous cultured epidermis named JACE for the treatment of serious burns, made 
by Japan Tissue Engineering Co., Ltd. (J-TEC), took seven years before, in 2007, it 
received government approval to culture and sell, and another two before it was listed 
as an item covered by the country’s national health insurance (J-Tec, 2015). But after 
Shinya Yamanaka’s successful publication of his research on human iPS in late 2007, 
the government appointed the Council for Science and Technology Policy (later 
renamed the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation), a scientific advisory 
board reporting to the Prime Minister that would play an important role in the 
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regulatory reforms. Various strategies were created to encourage the launch of 
government-led projects in RM, funding was increased, especially for iPS, and 
regulation was adjusted (see Kawakami et al., 2010; Mikami, 2015; Sleeboom-
Faulkner et al., 2011). Nevertheless, many scientists continued to complain about 
regulatory complexities hampering the clinical translation of RM. 
 
It was not just frustration with Japan’s regulatory bureaucracy, but also the insight 
that it would be possible to turn the regulatory gaps between countries into an 
advantage, which led some entrepreneurial-minded scientists to initiate transnational 
biotech ventures. Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra (2011) illustrate how the Indian-
Japanese joint-venture, Japan-India Centre for Regenerative Medicine (JCRM) boasts 
a large scientific, political and financial network in both Japan and India, and has 
organized clinical stem cell application for a range of diseases, including spinal cord 
injury, cardiovascular diseases and cirrhosis of the liver, and immune diseases in 
India. Settled in Japan and established as a cardiac surgeon at a university there, 
Indian-born scientist entrepreneur Kumar commuted between India and Japan to 
overcome regulatory boundaries. In 2005, Kumar and a group of Japanese scientists 
and companies set up JCRM as a charitable company in Chennai, India, with Japanese 
equity. In 2008, Kumar reported that the company’s charitable goals had led to profit 
in the long run:  
 
We now have plans for a lot of years. We have proven that corneal limbal 
tissues taken from the same patients or person, cultivated by our method and 
reinserted into the eye, regenerates the normal cornea inside the person – on 
the basis of animal research. After having proven this, it can be applied. 
Corneal cells have some problems in common with the endothelium. If we do 
the research here, then we have ten years of research ahead of us, as there are 
various regulatory complications. The Waseda people gave us the materials 
and our Indian guys tried the primary culture in the laboratory. Then we did 
the collaboration with an institute in India. There they did the basic study and 
animal study in the lab in India, and the tissue engineering before application 
in the hospital (Interview, Kumar).  
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Here we find that regulatory brokerage takes place by a simple strategic use of 
regulatory discrepancy and avoiding regulatory clashes where possible. Although 
there are differences in healthcare, wealth and scientific development between the 
countries, it is the regulatory discrepancy that is crucial to JCRM’s decision to start 
operating in India. Regulation for stem cell application had not been put into place 
until 2007 (DBT and ICMR, 2007), from which time JCRM managed to avoid having 
to apply for ethical permission by providing stem cell isolation/expansion services to 
Indian hospitals (Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra, 2011). Formally, hospitals need to 
follow the guidelines of the Institutional Ethics Committee and Institutional 
Committee for Stem Cell Research and Therapy (IEC/IC-SCRT), stipulated by the 
ICMR. The guidelines permit the use of autologous stem cells in research and 
treatment, provided the protocols are approved by these committees, and registered 
with the National Accreditation Committee for Stem Cell Research and Therapy 
(DBT and ICMR, 2007). But, as there is no adequate supervision over the ethics 
committees, and, as the National Accreditation Committee had not yet been formed, 
regulation did not stand in the way of research and therapeutic applications. The 
Consul General of Japan, frequently present at JCRM’s public events, seemed to 
imply formal endorsement of JCRM’s activities. By definition, its omissions of 
regulatory requirement in both India and Japan has ethical and health implications for 
patients in India and reputational implications for Japan’s RM community. Public 
awareness of these omissions would enable both patients and scientists to ask why. 
  
Case 2: Regulatory brokerage with official support 
In the 2010s, Japan’s life sciences underwent various changes, including the 
legalization of clinical research on cells differentiated from pluripotent stem cells, and 
policy strategies, such as the ‘Highway for the Realization of RM’, the Japan 
Revitalisation Strategy, and the Plan for the Promotion of Medical Research and 
Development (Headquarters for Healthcare Policy, 2014). The strategies aimed to 
increase coordination among the ministries and to enhance Japan’s global 
competitiveness in the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries, including 
the areas of medical products and equipment, RM, and personalized medicine. The 
final aim was to strengthen competition in the Euro-American market in the field of 
drugs and devices through technological innovation and to create the infrastructure for 
regenerative and personalized medicine abroad and at home. 
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In February 2012, the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare’s outlined the five-year 
strategy intended to serve as the core driver of Japan’s economic growth (MoHWL, 
2012). It emphasized the bridge-building between industry and academia [hashi-
watashi] by stimulating venture capital to invest into biomedical science, and it 
allowed the outsourcing of cell processing and promoted joint research. Another 
emphasis was on improving the infrastructure for clinical trials and creating an 
environment that uses Japanese-made devices and instruments, making Japan the hub 
for clinical trials in Asia for the first time. A new funding body, the Japan Agency for 
Medical Research and Development (AMED), was to combine the budgets of three 
ministries – the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sports and the Ministry for International Trade and Industry. Japan’s 
Department of New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) were to support industrial applications, both domestically and overseas 
(NEDO, 2016). 
 NEDO, established as a semi-government organization in 1980 to promote the 
development of technology and new energy, in response to ‘a recent increase in open 
and global innovation’ has been promoting the establishment of world-standard 
technology, as well as market development, by drawing on established research 
networks in collaboration with foreign governments and relevant organizations. 
NEDO’s 2015 budget for the support of international expansion was 20.8 billion Yen 
(US$190m; £129m) (NEDO, 2015). One example of a collaborative network 
supported by NEDO is that between Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI) in Japan with 
Bangkok, where NEDO has an office. In Japan, the processing of cells had to be done 
by the doctor or university involved in the clinical application. KHI, which was 
developing an automatic cell-processing robot for stem cell applications, wanted to 
show that marketable products could result from clinical trials using the robotic 
machine. It regarded Japan’s regulation, however, as too slow and onerous. 
 After negotiation with various universities in Thailand, Chulalongkorn 
University decided to allow KHI’s robotic machine on the premises and to collaborate 
in a clinical trial. The parties signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2012. 




Especially in the beginning we have been wondering why they came to 
Thailand. They did not go to China, which is understandable. Political 
relations are not good. But they did not go to Singapore either. This is because 
they are potential competition. We were skeptical in the beginning. There is 
no such thing as a free lunch and all that. They now just want to have [Thai] 
FDA [Food and Drugs Administration] approval or a license. (Interview, 
Wattanapanit) 
 
Here, KHI strategically chose Chulalongkorn University as a collaborative partner, 
being confident that it would receive permission for conducting a clinical trial using 
the robotic machine. Chulalongkorn University, on the other hand, accepted the 
collaboration because the use of advanced equipment would help it both scientifically 
and financially. Although NEDO’s official support and the involvement of officials in 
Thailand had been encouraging factors in bringing about the collaboration, a leading 
Thai scientist said in 2013, the final year of the project, that KHI had been too 
optimistic about gaining permission for a clinical trial: The Thai government was 
expected to maintain the high reputation of its elite laboratories, and none of the 
scientists involved thought that Thai regulation was going to show favoritism 
(Interview, Wilipana).2 This Japanese–Thai collaboration illustrates how the 
difference between regulation in Thailand and Japan was the main resource for KHI 
to broker collaboration with the Thai laboratory. It raises questions about the use of 
Thai patients to prove the processing ability of a robotic machine, and it raises 
questions about the authority of state organizations to evade their own regulation.  
 
Case 3: Deregulation as regulatory brokerage 
The Office of Medical Innovation, a cabinet-level advisory organization set up in 
Japan in 2011, played an important role in the development of regulation by reducing 
sectionalism among the science, health and trade ministries, and by bringing industry 
and science closer together in developing more effective intellectual property and 
regulatory frameworks in the field. The Japanese Society of RM (JSRM) and the 
Forum for Innovative RM (FIRM) played major roles in directing the development of 
regulation in RM. In this ‘triple helix’ set-up, the prominent role of Professor Teruo 
Okano of Tokyo Women’s Medical University, well-known for his innovative ‘cell-
sheet’ therapy, played a major role. Made of human cells grown on temperature-
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responsive sheets, these cell-sheet products were used in various clinical applications, 
including for heart failure, which Okano was intent to market. The triple helix around 
Professor Okano embodied the link between regulation, science and industry. Okano 
was acting head of the Office of Medical Innovation, President of JSRM, and a co-
founder of FIRM. The JSRM, established in 2001, had been campaigning for the 
relaxation of Japanese government regulations concerning studies, clinical trials and 
clinical applications related to RM. Its 2012 ‘Yokohama Declaration’ made RM a 
priority in the Cabinet Secretariat’s Five-year Healthcare Innovation Strategy and has 
been instrumental in the creation of the new Act for the Promotion of RM, the 
Revised Japanese Pharmaceutical Law, and the Act to Ensure Safety in RM, which 
were approved in 2013 (JSRM, 2016). Okano’s collaboration with Osaka University 
Hospital’s cardiovascular surgeon Yoshiki Sawa, has been crucial to the success of 
CellSeed, a company set up by Okano in 2001. In 2007, Sawa announced the 
successful application of Okano’s cell-sheets into a patient with cardiomyopathy 
(Okano et al., 1995). Sawa is President of JSRM’s Board and led the publication of 
the Osaka Declaration (17 March 2016), which announced Japan’s role as world 
leader in universalizing RM and finding evidence for its safety (JSRM, 2016). Okano 
and Sawa are active representatives of the companies they work closely with, 
CellSeed and Terumo respectively, while their networks spread widely. Counting a 
membership of over 180 companies, FIRM was set up to promote the 
commercialization of RM in Japan. It aims to establish industry-led partnerships with 
governments, academia, research institutions and the private sector to promote a 
stable and welcoming international business environment.  
In 2013, a well-known leader in RM had severe complaints about Japan’s regulatory 
policies, which were widely shared by those interested in the commercialization of 
cell products. The leader explains the regulatory challenges and his role in the 
subsequent regulatory change:  
 
Sheets cannot sell in billions like molecules in drugs; we cannot do it, as they 
need many improvements. Only a small number can be transplanted. We 
require a new law for treating large numbers of patients. We have started 
clinical research on the cornea, the heart and the esophagus. I went to 
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Congress many times – I had to start teaching the committee – the Diet 
member alliance for the promotion of RM (‘zai seiiryo suishin giin renmei’) - 
in 2008, when we had this building built. In 2007, 9–10 professors had formed 
a study meeting. They submitted an opinion paper about autologous 
application. The Diet responded with the creation of the committee: they had 
to learn how clinical application is progressing. It took 5–6 years for the Diet 
and the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu), the three Ministries and the Legislation 
Office (hōseikyoku) to understand that we needed different regulation. To 
reach a decision on the situation took many years. Medical doctors only think 
of publications. I had to yell to them: ‘Patients are waiting!’ The JSRM 
needed to create new circumstances for regulation. Without efforts, there 
would be no law. (Interview, Asada) 
 
Financial inability was not the only factor that stopped scientists from taking their 
products through clinical trials and to industry. In RM, the ‘product is the process’, 
which means that the product requires a continuous track of developmental steps. It 
was argued that, as Japan did not have experimental spaces or ‘expanded-access 
related mechanisms’, such as hospital exemption, compassionate treatment in Europe 
or investigational new drugs (INDs) in the USA, scientists felt that testing 
opportunities were particularly limited in Japan. Other scientists and regulators have 
pointed out, however, that Japan’s Medical Practitioners’ Act or Advanced Medical 
Care B gave Japanese PIs similar or more spaces to ‘test’ their products (Tsuyuki et 
al., 2016).   
Nevertheless, some leading scientists urged the government to concede the 
regulatory demands of the Yokohama Declaration. RM needed infrastructural support 
that the government alone could not supply. Industrial investment was needed for 
clinical trials in RM, but industry was holding off. It was not that the Japanese market 
was not big enough; it was because infrastructural and regulatory conditions were 
unfavourable. One scientist explained in March 2013: 
 
The government has tried to give them funding, but to them it’s peanuts. If 
they decide they are interested, they pay themselves! … How are they [life 
science industry] going to collaborate with us? Their strategy is not to take 
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any funds from the government, as it can put restrictions on them. For instance, 
when companies would like to collaborate with Shimadzu or other [state] 
subsidised companies, Shimadzu has to say ‘we cannot collaborate with you, 
as we have government funding’, ‘we have a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), 
we cannot show any data’, or ‘Five years later, when the NDA expires, we are 
willing to disclose.’ Too late! (Interview, Kaketani) 
 
According to this scientist, industry is willing to work in a country that builds the 
platform and provides workable regulatory conditions: ‘That is why they try the UK 
first’ (Interview, Kaketani).  
 Another reason for regulatory reforms was that the Japanese government 
needed to wean scientists from government funding. In 2013, for example, the 
Japanese government invested US$150 billion into the science innovation budget, 
which was only about 10% of that of the NIH (Interview, Sonoda), while the 
availability of venture capital in Japan was much lower than in the USA and Europe 
(Interview, Kato). It was hoped that deregulation would get Japanese and foreign 
companies interested in paying for clinical trials, as they would now be less costly and 
would require fewer subjects before any products would be eligible for licensing. 
Apart from stimulating industrial investment into Japanese products, the plan was to 
attract foreign researchers and companies to test their products in Japan. This would, 
first, strengthen Japan’s ability to organize clinical trials, second, increase the 
purchase of Japanese products through joint-ventures, and, third, increase the need for 
international regulators to recognize Japanese procedures and systems of permission.  
 In 2012, it was decided to speed up the examination of medical devices and 
therapies through investment into the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency. 
In May 2013, the Law for the Promotion of RM was passed, obliging subsequent 
governments to support the field. Two other acts followed: the ‘Act to Ensure Safety 
in RM’ (RM Act) and the ‘Revised Pharmaceutical Affairs Law: The Pharmaceuticals, 
Medical Devices, and Other Therapeutic Products Act’ (PMD Act), both of which 
were enacted in November 2013 and became law in November 2014 (Azuma, 2015). 
The RM Act uses a three-tiered system based on risk assessment to determine the 
level of research oversight required. The PMD Act defines an expedited approval 
system for regenerative medical products, whereby a product is given conditional, 
time-limited marketing authorization.  
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 In short, Japan’s deregulation has created new regulatory relations between 
Japan and other countries, with Japan’s regulation being perceived as permissive. But 
the policy raises important ethical issues that, according to critics, require public 
discussion. Thus, a well-known legal scholar explains that safety and efficacy studies 
required before clinical trials are reduced to mainly safety studies and some 
presumptions about efficacy: ‘This is because iPS is expected to be effective; the 
regulation therefore is about “regenerative therapy” [saisei-chiryō] as “RM” is not a 
correct expression: We do not know yet if it is regenerative’ (Interview, Ito). Similar 
comments about this ‘expectation’ bias have been made by Japanese researchers 
(Interview, Takeuchi), and were commented on by an editorial in Nature, which 
pointed out that patients and the taxpayer will be paying for what are in essence 
unproven stem cell interventions (Nature, 2015: 163-164; see also Sipp, 2015).  
 
Case 4: International regulatory brokerage 
Regulatory brokerage at the higher level of government has laid the regulatory 
groundwork for international collaborations. One policy related to the new regulation 
stipulated the creation of comprehensive special zones (CSZs) for industrialization in 
2013, of which the Life Innovation in Keihin Coastal Areas CSZ for International 
Competitiveness is one example. It was set up to stimulate the innovation in RM and 
cell therapies (Kanagawa Prefecture, 2016). These CSZs play an important role in the 
facilitation of international collaboration.  
 Before the promulgation of the PMD Act in November 2014, only two 
products, J-Tec’s aJACE and JACC (Autologous cultured cartilage cells for cartilage 
defects and knee joints) had been approved. Shortly after the Act, two new cell 
therapy products obtained approval for marketing: Heartsheet, autologous skeletal 
myoblast sheets for cardiac regenerative therapy (Terumo, 2015) obtained conditional 
approval in September 2015 and Terumo has started production in the Keihin CSZ 
(Nikkei, 2016), and Temcell – formerly Prochymal – an allogeneic mesenchymal 
stem cell product for graft-vs-host disease prevention, a Mesoblast/JCR Phar-
maceuticals product (Meldrum, 2014) for which Mesoblast had acquired licensed-in 
technology from Osiris (Bersenev, 2015) and for which it obtained unconditional 
approval. Under the new RM Act, all four products are eligible for National Health 
Insurance reimbursement.  
 The regulatory changes in themselves led to a flurry of purchases and 
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collaborations, including regulatory brokerage on an international level. Japan’s 
pharmaceutical and industrial sectors have RM on their agendas, and industry groups 
estimate the domestic market for these therapies could top ¥3 trillion by 2050 (Kahn, 
2015). Deregulation has made Japan attractive not only to Japan’s pharmaceutical and 
related industries – some major players include Takeda, Astellas, Sumitomo 
Dainippon, Fujifilm, Kyowa Kirin, Healios, Terumo, and Eisai – but also to foreign 
companies. Interest in Japan by foreign companies exploded to such extent that one 
scientist referred to it as kusakariba	or ‘cutting from the hay-meadow commons’ 
(Interview, Takeuchi), implying a place from which numerous people hope to profit.3  
 The encouragement of rapid commercialization and internationalization has 
led to a rift within the academic community and an atmosphere of secrecy. One 
scientist, who left academic research, maintained that ‘stem cell therapy is overrated, 
especially treatment for the elderly’ (Interview, Yamamoto), while according to 
another, ‘regulation should not put up barriers, but offer clear traffic lights at least’ 
(Interview, Takeuchi). Others feel pressurized and overwhelmed by the burden of 
commercialization, preferring to collaborate with other academics, while some 
scientists feel isolated from their colleagues, as non-disclosure agreements have made 
many scientists secretive about their research. Some academics are keen to 
commercialize their work, but the need to market internationally leads them to think 
in terms that illustrate regulatory brokerage. Dr Hirogawa, a researcher in Kyoto 
explained: 
 
There is a lot of secrecy here. No one talks. I never speak with Kumamoto, even 
though he is my neighbour. I am unhappy here. There is much competition and 
everyone is careful. There is much Venture Capital available now. (Interview, 
Hirogawa) 
 
He is caught between two senior entrepreneurial scientists, who follow their own 
business agendas. So he decided to work out his own entrepreneurial strategy:  
 
We need to compare the conditions regarding the FDA and the PMDA. The 
American government also wants change. The final aim is commercialization, 
and it is feared that full permission will be very hard to get from the PMDA. I 
have to study the situation in the US and in Japan, and then decide where to go 
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ahead and apply for IND [investigational new drug] approval or for PMDA 
permission. The main achievement for me will be commercialization. (Interview, 
Hirogawa) 
In early 2016, this researcher decided to move to a smaller university where he would 
be left to develop his own commercial network.  
 
Regulatory brokerage has thus taken on international proportions among wealthy, 
advanced industrial countries. The negotiations that take place in the Keihin Coastal 
Area Comprehensive Special Zone (CSZ) in Kanagawa Prefecture illustrate how the 
particular regulatory features of countries can be combined in international strategies. 
With the support of FIRM, Keihin Coastal Areas is doing its utmost to attract industry. 
In 2017, ten companies within FIRM (Fujifilm, Astellas Pharma, Janssen Pharma, 
Regience, Rohto Pharmaceutical, Cell Seed, Wako Pure Chemical, Takara Bio, Tella, 
MediNet), initiated a taskforce called RM Industrialization Task Force (RMIT) to 
establish a RM development centre in Kawasaki city, in the Keihin Coastal Area. The 
group is inviting overseas biotech companies to join them, to pool technologies and to 
provide treatments using cultured cells. The major areas of the development are cell 
processing and culturing, cell sheets, materials, equipment, reagents and 
pharmaceuticals (Ogawa, 2015). 
 
Representatives of Kanagawa/Keihin – like those of the UK’s Cell and Gene Therapy 
Catapult – list the advantages of their respective science parks in a self-congratulatory 
dance of mutual grooming. Kanagawa/Keihin is pictured as close to Haneda airport, 
allowing one-day round trips to Asian countries and offering deregulation, subsidies 
and tax advantages. Located at a distance from conglomerated areas, it allows for 
R&D using blood or bacteria. It has a local government open to industrial applications 
in RM. Its closeness to Tokyo Metropolitan area, with over 40 million people (‘one-
third of Japan’) makes for access to many patients in a super-ageing society. It has a 
Life Innovation Centre (LIC) with a large hospital network counting fifteen hospitals 
and 7,900 beds, and possibilities for integration with other advanced medical 
technologies. Finally, the Kanagawa Centre for Clinical Research and Strategy boasts 
connections with the PMDA that can facilitate early permission, and a number of 
memoranda of understanding, including with interested organizations in Singapore, 
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various states in the US, France, Germany, Finland, the UK and the World Health 
Organization.4  
  One prominent British delegate from the regenerative medicine community at 
the UK-JAPAN Life Innovation Symposium ‘Opportunities for UK-Japan 
Collaborations in Cell and Gene Therapy’ in Kawasaki in early 2016 recommended 
combining aspects of the regulatory systems of Japan and the UK. Identifying a gap 
between science and patient needs, he proposes the Academia, Business and Clinical 
approach, whereby both Japan and the UK score high on government and public 
support, infrastructure and R&D in academia, life science–industry collaboration, 
manufacturing, commercial support, cell automation and banking in business and 
hospitals and translational research in the clinic. From a regulatory point of view, 
according to the speaker, the countries differ: The regulation and reimbursement for 
cell and gene therapies (CGTs) – a European term for regenerative medical products – 
in Japan is both sensible and pragmatic. The question, then, is: ‘How can your and our 
regulation push cell therapy along the long development pathway?’ Typically, the 
pathway is ten to twelve years, but venture capital funds only invest in years five to 
seven. The financial gap and the risk of no reimbursement by health insurers are the 
main problems. According to the speaker, the EU and the US have tried to accelerate 
the regulatory pathway and reimbursement, but these are still not advantageous in the 
EU. Working together, he argues, can overcome various problems, also for Japan, 
through a trick: combining the Japanese and European systems. The problem with 
current international regulation, the speaker argues, is that it is inappropriate for 
CGTs: 
 
The MHRA are holding discussions with Japanese regulators to discuss 
harmonization. Conventional regulation is an incredibly long process. It was 
for drugs; it has been adapted for biologicals, but it is inappropriate for CGT. 
Efficacy of CGTs is incredibly high: They work! We do not need many 
patients to show this. We have many therapies that only need two phases. We 
only need proof of concept in patients: We don’t need many patients. The first 
in human application in a few patients is crucial. Then we need post-marketing 
studies.  
 
According to the scientist, the plan involves only two steps: 
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There are challenges with the regulation internationally. In Japan, there are 
great conditions for approval; it is a big improvement compared to the UK/US. 
If we start a clinical trial in the EU, you start with a first-in-man in the UK; 
then you need to do a bridging study – six patients – to get to Japan. In Japan, 
you get a conditional and time-limited approval, which means you get 
reimbursement. It also helps clinical experience in Japan and getting economic 
data. The trick is to have a parallel study in Europe: It would be a randomized 
control study in the UK, which is much better in Europe. The advantages are, 
first, you get quicker approval internationally, second, you do not need to wait 
as long for approval, and, third, you get higher reimbursement.  
 
From the point of view of life scientists knowledgeable about various regulatory 
systems and aware of the importance of becoming international early on, this ‘trick’ is 
an attractive strategy of regulatory brokerage and conforms entirely to formal 
regulatory provisions in place in both countries. Nevertheless, we also see that this 
form of international regulatory brokerage, ageing populations are offered as testing 
material for products that are only presumed to work, a notion that calls out for public 
discussion. And as pointed out by various scientists, Japan should not use its tax 
money to pay foreign companies to experiment, even if experiments yield some 
successful products. Different camps of scientists have come about, whereby some 
feel that the quality of science suffers from the demands of Japan’s international 
ambition, while others ride high on the wave of opportunities it has created. 
 
Case 5: Global brokerage and regulatory ‘harmonization’ 
The previous case points at some difficulties at the heart of Japan’s deregulation. The 
expected efficacy requirements for conditional and time-limited marketing permission 
differ from those of the authoritative International Society for Stem Cell Research 
(ISSCR). The ISSCR, an organization widely (but not necessarily correctly) thought 
to only represent scientists from ‘Western’ elite laboratories, propagates standards of 
safety and ethics through its website, affiliation to elite research centres, 
representation on the boards of journals and funding agencies, and its widely attended 
conferences. The difference between Japan’s and ‘international’ standards entails at 
least two major challenges:	
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• Gaining international acceptance of cell therapy products licensed in Japan to 
access the global market  
• Maintaining the reputation of Japan’s science, if inferior products are licensed 
without internationally accepted evidence 
To address these challenges, regulators and scientists have tried to gain international 
acknowledgement of the validity of the new Japanese regulation. They have done this 
by first, persuading other governments to follow Japan’s regulatory model, which 
would turn Japan into a leading example, second, lobbying with global regulatory 
agencies, industry and scientists to involve them in discussions about regulation, and, 
third, pushing for international regulatory standards for cell therapy producers.  
 Deregulation both encourages and requires a prioritization of scaling up and 
international industrialization; only off-the-shelf products are regarded as affordable 
and in the long run the only way to recoup the large investments into cell therapy 
products. In Japan, clinical trials are unaffordable for academic institutions, which is 
why IND-led clinical research may be done ‘under GMP- (good manufacturing 
practice) like conditions’ (Interview, Hirogawa).5 And, without state support for 
quality control for clinical trials, RM clinical studies, which cost roughly ¥50 million 
(US$500k), are beyond the budgets of academia. One researcher argues that, 
regardless of the new ‘deregulation’, the way forward in RM requires clear industrial 
standards for companies to manufacture therapies that are affordable and safe. This 
involves the scaling up of production and the creation of international agreement on a 
‘smart’ form of cell processing – a form of process monitoring and validation, 
whereby raw material, process, facility and manufacturing may be variable – which in 
turn requires scientists to work in tune with the manufacturing process. Regulation 
modeled after the ICH guidelines would enable the development of therapies 
attractive to industry. This idea is now on top of the agenda of the PMDA (Interview, 
Kato), and, indeed various stakeholders are working towards this purpose (JSRM, 
2015: 2-5). 
 AMED, the PMDA and FIRM work closely together to achieve this. In 
February 2011, the Stem Cell Evaluation Technology Research Association, a system 
for the evaluation of marketing and post-marketing, was founded, which in 2015 was 
reorganized under AMED and FIRM (SCETRA, 2015). AMED, with a budget of 
¥121 billion (US$1.27 billion) in 2014, is tasked to maintain an efficient and better 
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environment for R&D. Funding and managing projects with 330 staff, it negotiates 
the coordination and insurance of clinical trials and clinical research with Asia (Japan, 
China and South Korea), and has established overseas offices in the United States 
(Washington DC), the United Kingdom (London), and Singapore (AMED, 2016). The 
PMDA has created the ‘PMDA International Strategic Plan 2015’ to establish inter 
alia a Regulatory Science Centre, and to launch the ‘Asian Training Center for 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Regulatory Affairs’ (PMDA, 2015); it invites 
regulators from other countries to international conferences to discuss and propagate 
Japan’s regulatory system (PMDA, 2016).  
FIRM especially engages with global industry, and according to FIRM 
Chairman Yuzo Toda, FIRM ‘strives to promote Japan's novel regulatory system to 
the world’ (Okano et al., 2015). It also does so in Asia through the Asia Partnership 
Conference of RM Associations (QLifePro, 2018) and in the West through the 
Alliance for RM (ARM, 2016), the international organization representing RM and 
advanced therapies in the West. In March 2015, ARM announced its memorandum of 
understanding with Japan’s FIRM. The Alliance’s Chairman, Edward Lanphier said:  
 
Our collaboration with FIRM is an important step towards ensuring the 
continued growth and support of this field. … With the recent changes in 
Japan’s regulatory environment, FIRM is uniquely positioned as a vital partner 
in promoting the success of RM and advanced therapies worldwide (ARM, 
2015).  
 
With a similar mission to accelerate research, development and commercialization of 
RM and advanced therapies products, the two organizations seek global regulatory 
harmonization. One question that arises here, is how regulatory harmonization fueled 




Compared to molecular medicine, the ‘lively’ nature of RM makes it unsuitable for 
global clinical trials, which is why new regulation was developed. This article 
explores the role of regulatory brokerage in such regulatory change. If regulatory 
change is largely driven by regulatory brokerage, important issues related to social 
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and cultural values and human rights may be bypassed. I define regulatory brokerage 
as a form of science-entrepreneurship that takes advantage of regulatory variability in 
the negotiation of collaborative scientific research and in the shaping of regulation. 
Exemplifying forms of regulatory brokerage at various levels of organization and 
governance, I have shown how regulation is used commodified and used as regulatory 
capital in negotiations. Differences between relatively permissive and prohibitive 
regulation are utilized to broker transnational collaboration to gain a competitive edge. 
What the five cases here have in common is that, rather than complying with 
regulation in terms of such goals as safety, efficacy and ethics, regulation is 
commodified and utilized as ‘regulatory capital’. Here, it is notable that the five cases 
show that the commodification of regulation occurs at different levels of international 
collaboration and governance. Regulatory brokerage at the global levels of 
negotiating and shaping regulatory regimes is just as driven by competitive advantage 
as is regulatory brokerage on the lowest level of international science-collaborations 
among companies.  
In what follows, I suggest that lower levels of regulatory brokerage precede 
higher levels of regulatory brokerage for political, scientific and economic reasons. I 
argue that regulatory brokerage as the basis for regulatory reform bypasses issues that 
need to be decided by a broader public. Last, I point to examples of transnational 
collaboration that are not driven by competitive advantage to show that regulatory 
brokerage can be resisted, when other considerations trump.  
Tracing forms of regulatory brokerage in Japan has helped to generate 
understanding of the pressures and drivers behind regulatory reform. Forms of 
regulatory brokerage have changed radically over time, starting out with relatively 
prohibitive regulation in the early 2010s, and becoming increasingly permissive after 
Japan started to focus on translation of iPS in the late 2010s. The first case of 
regulatory brokerage by a science-entrepreneur in JCRM revealed a simple unilateral 
strategic use of the regulatory gap between companies and organizations in India and 
Japan, and the utilization of infrastructural, economic and scientific differences since 
2005. The second case, of Japan-Thai collaboration initiated by Kawasaki Heavy 
Industry, describes the bilateral use of regulatory differences regarding the 
permissions for conducting clinical trials and marketing in 2011. The collaboration 
was brokered using regulatory capital on the Thai side, even though, as discussed 
below, the regulatory capital was contingent upon decision-making by Thai regulatory 
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bodies. As KHI wanted to test the robotic processes through a successful clinical trial, 
and as Chulalongkorn University hoped to benefit from using it and the scientific 
training accompanying it, the agreement was explicitly bilateral. Interestingly, the 
venture was financially supported by state organizations in both countries, which 
made the evasion of regulatory hurdles a state-supported undertaking. Despite the 
presence of officials and royals, the collaboration was emphasized as one between 
academic and commercial institutions. The third case shows how the push toward 
deregulation and the reconfiguration of rules in Japan by some industrial and 
professional organizations constitutes a form of regulatory brokerage, as the 
deregulation aimed to attract investment and industrial companies to Japan, 
reformulating criteria for safety, efficacy and ethics. The fourth case exemplifies a 
case of international regulatory brokerage. It described an openly proposed ‘trick’ for 
industry in Japan and the UK to accelerate the commercialization of RM with the 
support of regulatory agencies in both countries. This form of regulatory brokerage 
was advertised as combining the advantages of both regulatory systems. The last case 
illustrates how Japan, to gain acceptance of its cell therapy products and to maintain 
its scientific reputation, engaged in regulatory brokerage through overseas offices in 
Asia and in the West to create international industrial alliances and to lobby for 
deregulation. Minimizing global regulatory differences became advantageous both to 
the Japanese (who saw themselves as setting the standard, and wanting the world to 
accept it) and to ARM, to which liberalized regulation seemed the only way to catch 
up. In this case, too, regulation is being brokered in the first place as a commodity, 
rather than as a vehicle to ensure safety, efficacy and ethical practice. 
These examples show that regulatory expedience is an economic driving force, 
whereby comparative advantage incentivizes research collaboration. State 
organizations, we saw, encourage such collaborations, violating the spirit of the 
country’s regulation. Moreover, policies of deregulation, investment in infrastructure 
and legal measures in Japan clearly assumed that they would accelerate the translation 
of RM in Japan, attract foreign investment, and in the end lead to more affordable 
healthcare provision for Japan’s rapidly ageing population. The ensuing regulatory 
discrepancy with other countries attracted foreign industrial capacity and investment 
from abroad and Japan. Deregulation was also the reason for foreign scientists and 
official representatives to broker a situation in which science and industry could take 
advantage of features of both country’s regulation. Japan’s perceived regulatory 
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permissiveness put pressure on other countries to take similar measures, now at the 
level of international harmonization and competition. At the same time, Japan had to 
do groundwork to persuade other countries that deregulation must not be equated with 
allowing the marketing of inferior products. As international industry is already under 
pressure to deregulate, international alliances were formed to lobby with governments 
to liberalize regulatory standards. It is clear, then, that regulatory reform efforts in the 
field of RM described here have taken place for political, scientific and economic 
reasons: through regulatory brokerage. 
 We have seen, then, that regulatory brokerage may evade state regulation 
(case 1), evade state regulation with state sponsorship (case 2), create comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis other states (case 3), provide a setup for bilateral advantages 
among states (case 4), and facilitate global powers to reform international regulation 
(case 5). But whatever the motivation given for regulatory reform, such as the 
acceleration of translational research, scientific advance and savings on healthcare, 
regulatory brokerage is always about competitive advantage, regardless of any 
specific motivation.  
There is a need for public discussion about the issues bypassed by regulatory 
brokerage as the basis for regulatory reform. In particular, transnational collaboration 
for reasons of regulatory advantage avoid responsibilities associated with ethical and 
legal behaviour ‘at home’, and so raise interrelated bioconstitutional, socio-economic 
and ethical issues. As shown in cases one and two, regulatory brokerage entails 
important socio-economic issues concerning whether transnational collaboration with 
countries with scarce resources justifies the investment into it by the host countries 
(India and Thailand here), especially when its advertised values depend on regulatory 
discrepancies in the first place. There are also ethical issues related to whether 
experimental service providers should be allowed to import and export health risks to 
patients at home or abroad. Regulatory brokerage becomes especially problematic if it 
is treated as a proxy for public healthcare in the country importing experimental 
clinical applications. This issue becomes especially poignant in the case of the 
brokerage of regulatory regimes (cases 3–5). Pushing regulation that undercuts 
international competition as a policy of economic expansion in the area of testing RM 
entails unknown risks, as I discussed in the introduction. 
On a national level, we see that international brokerage in Japan has involved 
the political rigging of public resources in support of RM, and pressure to accelerate 
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clinical translation and marketing. Despite concern given to ELSI issues, it has ethical 
consequences for patients, if they are required to contribute to treatment that is 
expected to work rather than proven to work. At the same time, international 
companies are attracted to test their products on Japanese patients and indirectly 
subsidized by both Japanese patients and insurance companies. Strategic regulatory 
changes that have the potential to affect the quality of science and internalize the 
financial and risk burden for patients require public consideration.  
On an international or bilateral level, taking advantage of each other’s 
regulation as a strategy of entrepreneurial scientists to accelerate clinical translation, 
as we saw in case 4, violates the spirit of the regulation in both countries. Should 
members of the government bureaucracy be obliged to report to the public cases that 
contradict a country’s regulation or its spirit?  
On a global level, we need to ask whether regulatory issues in RM should be 
decided by industry. Considering the fundamental disagreement on the state of the art 
among scientists, there needs to be far more transparency on regulatory reform with 
involvement of independent outsiders, both from wealthy countries and LMICs. 
Discussion on regulation should consider scenarios of regulatory brokerage when 
formulating regulatory reform.  
Considering the socio-economic consequences, insights into the role of 
regulatory brokerage give a worrying impression of competition as the basis for 
regulatory change. However, the examples above also show instances where 
regulatory brokerage was rejected, even when it could have yielded short-term benefit. 
In the second case, Thai scientists from Chulalongkorn University were concerned 
with the quality of their science and their reputation, and did not support the early 
marketing or premature clinical trials. Similarly, the ISSCR regarded clinical trials 
based on ‘probable evidence of efficacy’ as problematic (ISSCR, 2016). Such stances 
show that a slippery slope of regulatory brokerage is not inevitable, even though there 
might be an uphill struggle. The current pro-curement focus depoliticizes the field and 
needs further bioconstitutional considerations. Research on regulatory brokerage 
needs to further explicate how international regulatory decision-making and national 
regulation interact, and how conflicts of interest between industry and science 
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Notes 
                                                
1 For instance, as of 16 March 2016, EMA has approved only 6 products: three tissue 
engineering products (ChondroCelect [2009], Maci [2013] and Holoclar [2014], the last of 
which is approved only conditionally), two gene therapy products (Glybera [2012] and 
Imlygic) and one somatic cell medicinal product (Provenge [2013]), which has been 
withdrawn (Detela, 2016). 
2 Indeed, permission for using ‘mesenchymal stem cells’ processed by the robotic machine in 
a clinical trial on knee cartilage deficiency was not given until late 2016 (Kawasaki, 2016). 
Though this shed positive light on the automaton, what KHI needs to show that its processed 
cells are used in a product with marketing permission. 
3 Some collaborations announced in recent years include: Athersys with Healios KK for novel 
cell therapy treatments, including MultiStem for ischemic stroke (Athersys, 2016), Avita 
Medica with INDEE Medical for their ReCell® device for autologous cell treatment for burns, 
reconstructive and cosmetic procedures (Densford, 2016), Cynata (Australia), and Regience 
KK to develop and commercialize Cynata’s therapeutic mesenchymal stem cell (MSC) 
technology for Japan and for certain Asian countries (Cynata Therapeutics, 2016), Mesoblast 
(Australia) with JCR Pharmaceuticals to market Prochymal®, an allogeneic MSC product for 
graft-vs-host disease (GVHD). Cytori (USA) announced first patient enrollment/treatment in 
their Japanese physician-initiated ADRESU trial for Cell Therapy™ (Cytori, 2015); Pluristem 
(Israel) reached agreement with the PMDA on the design for a 75-patient phase I/II trial in 
Japan for PLX-PAD for the treatment of CLI (Pleuristem, 2016); RepriCell (Canada) 
collaboration with Shiseido for their RCH-01 therapy (RepriCell, 2013); and, Regeneus 
(Australia) announced targeting Japan for their allogeneic adipose-derived mesenchymal stem 
cell (MSC) off-the-shelf product, Progenza (Reneus, 2014). 
4 For comparison, the British counterparts showcase the attractions of the Cell and Gene 
Therapy Catapult – an independent non-profit organization, set up in 2012 – listing its 
advantages for transport, industry and R&D. Other benefits that are emphasized include: 
government support for the first eight of the nine phases of clinical translation in product 
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